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A Policy for Science
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Bethesda, Maryland
Policy and science often interact. Typically, we think of policymakers looking to scientists for advice on issues
informed by science. We may appreciate less the opposite look: where people outside science inform policies
that affect the conduct of science. In clinical medicine, we are forced to make decisions about practices for
which there is insufficient, inadequate evidence to know whether they improve clinical outcomes, yet the health
care system may not be structured to rapidly generate needed evidence. For example, when the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services noted insufficient evidence to support routine use of computed tomography
angiography and they called for a national commitment to completion of randomized trials, their call ran into
substantial opposition. I use the computed tomography angiography story to illustrate how we might consider a
“policy for science” in which stakeholders would band together to identify evidence gaps and to use their influ-
ence to promote the efficient design, implementation, and completion of high-quality randomized trials. Such a
policy for science could create a culture that incentivizes and invigorates the rapid generation of evidence, ulti-
mately engaging all clinicians, all patients, and indeed all stakeholders into the scientific enterprise.
(J Am Coll Cardiol 2012;59:2154–6) © 2012 by the American College of Cardiology Foundation
Published by Elsevier Inc. doi:10.1016/j.jacc.2011.11.070In late 2007, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) reviewed the literature on computed to-
mography coronary angiography (CTCA) and concluded
that there was little, if any, evidence showing that it
improves patient outcomes (1). CMS proceeded with a
“national coverage determination,” proposing that reim-
bursement for CTCA be limited to patients who were
enrolled in clinical trials. Julie Appleby, a health industry
reporter for USA Today described what, in her view,
happened next: “Specialty societies representing radiologists
and cardiologists were outraged—and they launched a
letter-writing campaign seeking to block the national cov-
erage determination. . .[through which CMS effectively]
launched the first salvo in what ultimately became a war.
Medicare lost—and CTCA remained a covered benefit for
a broad range of patients with possible heart disease” (1).
About 8 months later, during the summer of 2008, the
National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI)
hosted a workshop on outcomes research in cardiovascular
imaging. The workshop participants proposed designs for
trials of imaging in asymptomatic people, patients with
symptoms suggestive of myocardial ischemia, patients pre-
senting to emergency wards with suspected acute coronary
syndromes, and patients with heart failure (2). Shortly
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proposals for randomized trials that would test the ability of
CTCA to improve clinical outcome. In September 2009,
one of the proposals, the PROMISE (PROspective Multi-
center Imaging Study for Evaluation of Chest Pain,
NCT01174550) trial, was funded; today the trial, which is
led by Drs. Pamela Douglas and Kerry Lee, is enrolling
patients. Since then, at least 2 other government-funded
randomized trials of CTCA were launched.
The ongoing story of computed tomography (CT) an-
giography illustrates the tensions that often occur when
science and policy cross paths (3). We typically think of
“science for policy,” in which policymakers seek scientists’
expertise to make informed choices about public health
recommendations, safety, or environmental regulations and
coverage decisions. But there is also “policy for science,” in
which a different group of policymakers, often including
scientists, develop policies regarding priorities, strategies,
and standards for scientific investigation. In the case of CT
angiography, policymakers had to make coverage decisions
in the setting of inadequate evidence, but at almost the same
time, government scientists and leaders in the imaging
community engaged in a dialogue that eventually enabled
support for 3 major ongoing randomized trials. What
lessons can we learn from the CT angiography story?
Even before the CMS issued its CTCA coverage pro-
posal, clinicians debated about what standards should be
applied to cardiovascular imaging. Beginning in the mid
1980s, cardiovascular researchers designed and executed
dozens of large-scale practical clinical trials that established
high-level evidence for the care of patients with acute
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syndromes, heart failure due to systolic left ventricular
dysfunction, hypertension, hypercholesterolemia, life-
threatening arrhythmias, and other conditions. Should similar
large-scale trials also be required for diagnostic tests? After all, as
specialty societies who protested the CMS proposal argued,
“It has been well established in medicine that no diagnostic
test improves health outcomes by itself; only the resulting
therapeutic interventions may do so” (1). Yet, there are
ample precedents for performing outcomes-based random-
ized trials of diagnostic tests: examples include the fecal
occult blood test, mammography, ultrasonography for ab-
dominal aortic aneurysm, the prostate-specific antigen test,
ultrasonography and biomarkers for ovarian cancer, myo-
cardial perfusion imaging in asymptomatic patients with
diabetes, and, most recently, helical CT for lung cancer (4).
In some of these cases, such as the fecal occult blood test,
mammography, ultrasonography for aortic aneurysm, and
helical CT, randomized trials provided the link showing
that performance of the diagnostic test improved health
outcomes. In the others, randomized trials showed that
performance of the test did not improve outcomes. One
cannot automatically assume that a test’s ability to predict
outcomes or diagnose disease translates into its ability to
prevent clinical events (5).
Cardiovascular medicine prides itself as an evidence-
based specialty, yet the vast majority of guideline recom-
mendations are based on inferior evidence, evidence well
short of multiple randomized trials. Thought leaders in our
professional societies deserve credit for conducting and
reporting a recent review that found that only 11% of active
recommendations rely on the highest level evidence (level A)
and that nearly half are based only on “expert opinion” (6).
Even fewer recommendations for diagnostic tests were sup-
ported by high-level evidence. Some critics decry the common,
unquestioning use of high-technology imaging and other
diagnostic tests (7). Turka and Caplan (8) go further, calling
for a “wholesale rethink about how we approach evidence.”
Clinicians should think of non–evidence-based practices, prac-
tices for which definitive trials have not been done as “a
deviation of standard of care. . .only [to] be undertaken as part
of a clinical trial” (8). Admittedly, many thoughtful physicians
would question the wisdom (as well as the practicality) of
strictly applying this dictum. Furthermore, it is almost certainly
not necessary to require randomized trials for extremely effec-
tive treatments such as appendectomy and valve replacement
for severe symptomatic aortic stenosis (9).
Meanwhile, thought leaders bemoan increasing difficul-
ties performing randomized trials in the United States (10).
Most trials encounter problems with enrollment, budget,
and timely completion; a recent Institute of Medicine
review of cancer trials found that 40% had to be stopped for
failure to enroll (11). There are numerous contributing
factors, including excessive complexity that interferes with busy
clinical workflow and a culture that does not value highly the
enrollment of large numbers of patients into trials (10). BWe face a paradoxical situation
in which clinicians routinely en-
gage in practices that are not based
on high-quality evidence, yet we
have difficulty getting trials done.
The NHLBI is heavily engaged in
developing approaches and poli-
cies for increasing the success of
randomized trials; for example, in
the past year, we have held separate
workshops on trial recruitment, best
practices of data-coordinating cen-
ters, statistical considerations in ran-
domized trials, and priorities in cardiovascular comparative
effectiveness research (12). We have also adopted a strict
policy on trial accrual, enabling the Institute to more easily
stop funding failed efforts (13). We recognize that it is
unrealistic to apply randomized trials to all unanswered
clinical questions, and therefore a critical challenge is to
identify those questions that carry the most overriding
medical and societal importance. Carefully performed pro-
spective registries play important roles in assessing the
impact and feasibility of candidate trials and in interpreting
completed trials; these roles are especially clear in our
current difficult financial climate.
Still, we can go further. Suppose clinicians, patients,
professional societies, payers, research funding agencies, and
academics were to band together and adopt the “wholesale
rethink” approach of Turka and Caplan (8), insisting that
high-priority questions about unproven practices only occur
within the context of rigorous trials. There are partial
precedents. American maternal–fetal surgeons agreed that
all prenatal surgery for myelomeningocele be performed at 3
centers participating in a National Institutes of Health–
funded randomized trial (14). The NHLBI and the CMS
agreed to a coverage-for-evidence development arrange-
ment enabling performance of a definitive randomized trial
of lung reduction surgery for emphysema (15). For decades,
pediatric oncologists worked together to enable 80% to 90%
of their patients to be enrolled in randomized trials that
were funded by the National Cancer Institute (16). The
National Marfan Foundation, a patient advocacy group, has
called on its members to avoid using losartan until an
NHLBI trial is completed (17). In each case, stakeholders
came together, recognized that important clinical questions
were unanswered and chose to focus their efforts on en-
abling rapid design, implementation, and completion of
definitive randomized trials. In effect, the stakeholders
adopted a policy in which science was viewed as the tool to
each an answer. Science and policy were in synergy, not in
ension.
There are tradeoffs of the cost of trials versus the time it
akes to sort out what is effective over time without a trial.
he story of bone marrow transplantation for metastatic
reast cancer is a useful illustration. As pointed out by
Abbreviations
and Acronyms
CMS  Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid
Services
CT  computed
tomography
CTCA  computed
tomography coronary
angiography
NHLBI  National Heart,
Lung, and Blood Instituterownlee (18), 20 years elapsed between the early adop-
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clinical trials. Hundreds of oncologists transplanted tens of
thousands of women, “only a fraction of them as part of a
clinical trial” at a cost of $3 billion, a sum that exceeds by an
order magnitude the costs of the trials themselves (18). As
stated by Mark Helfand, “It is never rational to say we must do
something now because it will take too long to get the
evidence. Such actions time and again have been wrong” (19).
Working in collaboration with professional societies
uch as the American College of Cardiology, we could
xplicitly articulate a “policy for science.” Guidelines
riters often encounter questions about practices that are
nsupported by high-level evidence. Instead of settling
or classifying a practice as evidence level B or C, they
ould adopt Class 1 recommendations to “enroll eligible
atients into trial X.” For example, guidelines writers
ould recommend that if logistically possible, eligible pa-
ients with suspected coronary disease be randomized into
ROMISE (NCT01174550) or that eligible patients with
trial fibrillation be randomized into CABANA (Catheter
blation Versus Anti-arrhythmic Drug Therapy in for Atrial
ibrillation Trial, NCT00911508). I recognize that al-
hough this activity might support efforts to increase the
umber and quality of trials, some would think that it
xceeds the mandate of guidelines committees and could
esult in their independence being questioned and the
mpact of their recommendations thereby reduced. Hence,
nother option might be to highlight uncertainty and
ngoing trials in the text of guidelines documents without
xplicitly endorsing specific trials.
Widespread adoption of a policy for science could create
culture that incentivizes and invigorates the rapid gener-
tion of evidence, ultimately engaging all clinicians, all
atients, and indeed all stakeholders into the scientific
nterprise. Admittedly, it will be difficult to accomplish in a
ragmented health care system, one that is still burdened by
any forces that promote overutilization (20). Yet, had such
culture existed in 2007, we would have faced pressures to
et many CT angiography trials launched and completed.
oon, we would find ourselves occupied with interpreting
ndings and disseminating evidence-based practices. Most
mportant, instead of being seen as fighting wars, we would
nstead be perceived correctly as working together to ensure
hat our patients benefit from the incredible power of the
cientific method (21).
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